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Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The Best Way Forward 
Introduction 
 
The competence of domestic legal orders, through their legal system, to provide an adequate 
environment to the development of contractual relationships of certain communities is being 
more and more questioned. This is particularly the case in transnational commercial and financial 
contractual relationships, where national law and domestic courts have been unable to provide a 
proper framework for their growth
1
. In this context, it is without surprise that international 
arbitration “has become the principal method of resolving disputes between States, individuals, 




The increasing importance of private justice and the need to redefine the concept of law, to better 
serve different particular communities, brought along with it questions regarding the concept of 
legal order, the concept of law and the interaction between the different stakeholders (State, 
private actors, private institutions). Through this process, and according to the needs specified 
above, some authors
3
 sustain that a new concept of law has emerged which is neither public nor 
private (in other words non statist law) and would not depend for its existence on its enactment 
by any particular domestic legal order. This law would be transnational. 
 
The emergence of a Transnational Law, which is perceived in the commercial and financial 
sphere as the New Lex Mercatoria, has had a considerable impact on the practice of International 
Arbitration. Under the influence of this new “law”, commercial arbitration is reframing the 
traditional interplay between legal orders, legal instruments and actors in the arbitration field, in 
other words, being transnationalised. 
 
                                                        
1
 For a convergent view see Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative Commercial Financial and Trade 
Law (Vol I). 
2
 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration 5
th
 edition (1.01). 
3
 For a convergent view see Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative Commercial Financial and Trade 
Law (Vol. I). 
4 
Understanding the process of “Transnationalization” of commercial arbitration implies 
establishing the traditional framework of International Commercial Arbitration (I), reviewing the 
basic the notions of Transnational Law (II), analyzing the concept of Transnational Arbitration 
(III) and identifying the Transnational aspects of Commercial Arbitration (IV). In the conclusion 
of this paper we will bring some ideas relating to the path that arbitration should follow in our 
“transnationalized world”. 
I. International Commercial Arbitration: Legal Framework 
A. International and Commercial Character of Arbitration 
 
“Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution in which the parties agree to submit their differences 




The legal framework of international commercial disputes being understood as having 
particularities which shall be given special attention, the first question to answer would therefore 
be: what is “international” and what is “commercial”?  
a) International Arbitration 
 
It is interesting to notice right from the start that there is no standard definition of what is 
“International“ in arbitration, “…each state having its own test for determining whether an 
arbitration award is domestic or, in the language of the New York Convention foreign”
5
. 
Nevertheless, usually, qualification as International of a dispute will refer either to its nature, to 
the nationality of the parties or to the place of arbitration. 
 
As an example, according to Swiss arbitration law
6
, an Arbitration is deemed to be International 
if, at the moment of the celebration of the agreement to arbitrate, one of the parties was neither 
habitually resident nor domiciled in Switzerland. 
 
                                                        
4
 Goode on Commercial Law 4th edition (page 1999) 
5
 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration  5
th
 edition (1.28) 
6




 defined an International Arbitration as follows
8
: 
- An arbitration is international if: 
 
(a) The parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that 
agreement, their places of business in different states; or 
 
(b) One of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their 
places of business: 
 
(i) The place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement; 
 
(ii) Any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is 
to be performed or the place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most 
closely connected; or  
 
(c) The parties have agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to 
more than one country. 
 
b) Commercial Arbitration 
 
As for the definition of the term international, the concept of commerciality brings along with it 
the same pattern since no common definition exists. For this purpose, international arbitration 





“The term commercial should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from 
all relationships of commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a 
                                                        
7
 The Model Law is a success story as an instrument for harmonizing legislation. As pointed out by 
Redfern and Hunter (on International Arbitration 5
th
 edition1 .232) it has served as basis for legislation in 
more than 40 major states. 
8
 Model Law, Art 1 (3) 
9
 The definition appears as footnote to Art. 1(1). 
6 
commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade 
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial 
representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; 
licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; 
joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-operation; carriage of goods or 
passengers by air, sea, rail or road”. 
 
Internationality and commerciality have been elements of particular relevance in the 
development of arbitration. Nevertheless, this private justice mechanism could not be understood 
without having in mind its legal sources. 
 
B. Legal Sources 
 
“(…) besides not being created by the law of a country nor being part of its political 
organization, ( arbitral tribunals)  have relevant legal connections to more than one country 
and, therefore, no country holds exclusive jurisdiction to define their legal framework. 
Consequently, these tribunals do not have a lex fori as the public courts do and are not governed 




From the above stated, it is quite evident that determining the proper legal framework in cases of 
disputes in international arbitration might consist in a complex task due to the interplay between 
domestic and international legal instruments, party autonomy, private institutes rules and 
procedures. In practice, international arbitration legal framework is determined through the 




                                                        
10
 The Confluence of Transnational Rules and National Directives as the Legal Framework of 
Transnational Arbitration by Luís de Lima Pinheiro in estudos de Direito Civil, Direito Comercial e 
Direito Comercial Internacional, Almedina-2006, page 2. 
7 
a) Supranational Sources 
 
The ‘pierre angulaire’ of international arbitration is the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958. Not being exempt from 
critics, major trading nations became parties to the above-mentioned convention allowing 
arbitration to become “the established method of resolving international trade disputes”.
11
 Other 
conventions such as the European Convention of 1961
12
, the Panama Convention
13
 or even BIT’s 
might come into play in Arbitration and therefore need to be considered in the determination of 
the Arbitration’s legal framework, if such is the case. 
 
b) National Sources 
 
It is essentially through the lex arbitri that States provide regulation on International Arbitration. 
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that due to the process of recognition and enforcement of 
international awards, under the New York Convention, State courts also come into play on this 
procedure. The possibility of wide interpretation of the terms of the Convention by national 
courts, especially, in what it relates to the commercial or international nature of a dispute offers 
the possibility to State courts to have a determinant role in the assessment of the legal framework 
of an international dispute. 
 
c) Infranational and Transnational Sources 
 
“Infranational and transnational sources are autonomous sources in relation to the national and 
supranational authorities, mainly the rules of the arbitration centers and the custom based upon 
arbitration case law. The distinction between these two sources can be drawn with reference to 
                                                        
11
 Redfen and Hunter on International Arbitration (1.220). 
12
 The objective of the european convention of 1961 is the settlement of trade disputes between parties 
from different States, european or not, through arbitration. It also expressly recognizes the capacity of a 
state or other public body to enter an arbitration agreement. 
13
 The Panama Convention was signed by twelve South American States in January 1975, following the 
Inter-American Conference on Private International Law in Panama. This convention permits agreements 




the social sphere of a country: infranational sources are contained within this sphere; 




Private institutes (especially arbitral tribunals), due to practice and evolution based on parties 
needs, became sources of principles and rules that brought an harmonization effect in 
international arbitration. From this point of view, the determination of the legal framework of 
any arbitration will also depend on those common rules and practices. As Luis de Cordeiro 
correctly pointed out“The rules of arbitration centers are created by private institutions and are 
applied by the tribunals that operate within their scope independently of the relevance assigned 
to them by a singular national legal order. They are, for all these reasons, transnational other 




From the exposed above, International commercial arbitration legal framework shall be 
determined according to: 
 
 - International Conventions (namely the New York Convention); 
 
-National Law (essentially the lex arbitri, knowing that an important movement of 
harmonization has been taking place under the concept of the Model Law). 
 
      -Private institutes rules and procedures (ICC rules, Uncitral rules). 
 
C. In Summary 
 
International commercial arbitration has emerged in a legal environment in which predominance 
was given to Public International Law and Domestic Law. However, the development of 
transnational economic transactions, the need to regulate issues that might arise from them with a 
                                                        
14
 The Confluence of Transnational Rules and National Directives as the Legal Framework of 
Transnational Arbitration by Luís de Lima Pinheiro (page 7). 
15
 The Confluence of Transnational Rules and National Directives as the Legal Framework of 
Transnational Arbitration by Luís de Lima Pinheiro (page 8). 
 
9 
“proper” law, since as we above stated, national law and particularly private international law 
and its conflict of law system, seem to be quite limited as providing an adequate answer to the 
international markets needs, have been pushing towards the reshapment of commercial 
arbitration. The redefinition of the framework of International Commercial Arbitration has been 
based on the emergence of the concept of transnational law. It is therefore this evolution or 
“Transnationalisation” of international commercial arbitration that shall be the focus of our 
analysis. 
II. Transnational Law 
 
A. The Notion of Transnational Law 
 
More than half a century has elapsed since Jessup, in his Storrs Lectures given at the Yale 
school, popularized the term “Transnational Law
16
”. Jessup wrote that he “shall use the term 
“transnational law” to include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national 
frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not 




Consensus among scholars and practitioners regarding the concept of Transnational Law has not 
been reached. As demonstrated by a study carried out by CENTRAL
18
 in Munster, Germany, “in 
most cases where the parties expressly choose transnational law as the law governing their 
contract, they do so by referring to “general principles of law”, “transnational principles of 
law”, “lax moratoria”, “principles of international law”, etc”
19
. On the contrary, it has been 
understood that the concept of  “Transnational Law” blurs the traditional approach Public 
International Law
20
 / Private International Law
21
 and that nation States are no longer at the center 
of the process of law formation. 
                                                        
16
  Although Jessup was the first to apply the notion of transnationalisation to Law, he did not create the 
term. 
17
 Jessup, 1956, page 2. 
18
 The Center of Transnational Law (CENTRAL) at the University of Münster. 
19
 The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law, Michael Joachim Bonell, Unif. L. Rev. 2000-2, 
page 204. 
20
 Public International Law being traditionally the Law that regulates relations among States.  
10 
 
Craig Scott in “Transnational Law as Proto concept: Three Conceptions
22
”, has an interesting 
point of view. In his perspective, the concept of Transnational Law might be ascertained through 
three different approaches. The first one would divide existing law into two categories: 
international and domestic. Consequently, due to the interaction of these two legal orders the 
need for a particular distinguished transnational law is non-existing. The second approach, 
although recognizing traditional division between international and domestic law, would 
nevertheless identify the possibility of the existence of transnational issues that have been dealt 
with at the domestic and international level, through the emergence of convergent decisions, 
rules or standards. A third one would refer to the existence of autonomous standard rules, which 
would be in their essence neither domestic nor international. In this approach, these norms would 
belong to their own normative sphere and exist alongside with public/private international law, 
without being any of them. 
 
This third approach leads us to the idea of the emergence of a body of law which doesn’t have 
State as the holder of the monopoly of law creation, therefore implying that other private actors, 
or institutions, might participate in the process. In this context, transnational law might be 
understood as being  “ law (which) created and developed by the law making forces of a global 
civil society: (1) It is based on (a) general principles of law, derived from a functional 
comparative analysis of the “common core” of domestic legal systems, and (b) on the usages 
and customs of the international business community as expressed in standard contract forms 
and general business conditions, (2) it is administered and developed by private providers of 
alternative dispute resolution, and (3) it is enforced predominantly by virtue of social sanctions 
such as reputation and exclusion. Finally (4) its rules are codified – if at all – in the form of lists 





                                                                                                                                                                                  
21
 Private International Law being national law which seeks to regulate private relations that are 
connected with more than one legal order. 
22
  “Transnational Law” as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions, Craig Scott ,York University - Osgoode 
Hall Law School, German Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 7, page 877, 2009. 
23
 Gralf‐ Peter Calliess Law, Transnational, CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES VOL. 06 NO. 08 CLPE 
Research Paper 35/2010 Vol. 06 No. 8 (2010) page 6. 
11 
While this definition will certainly not reach consensus, it covers nevertheless the main ideas of 
how transnational law might be perceived.  
 
This definition focuses on: 
 
- The importance accorded to the general principles of law as being unanimously respected 
among the different legal orders; 
 
- The relevance of usages and customs, especially due to its importance in what it relates to 
financial and commercial matters; 
 
- Codification of certain rules (UNIDROIT principles, INCOTERMS) which act as an 
harmonization agent; 
 
- Relevance of alternative dispute resolution mechanism (the International Arbitration has 
become the principal method of resolving disputes between States, individuals, and 
corporations in almost every aspect of international trade, commerce and investment). 
 
The emergence of the concept of Transnational Law offered the possibility to identify the 
development of autonomous normative systems in particular fields, especially in those where it 
has been admitted that State or State law was ill equipped to provide adequate regulations to the 
needs of particular communities. This has specially been the case in the commercial and 
financial sphere where it has been affirmed that such an autonomous legal order exists, under the 
revival of the New Lex Mercatoria. 
 
B. The New Lex Mercatoria 
 
“The Lex mercatoria conjures up romantic notions of ancient laws and practices in medieval 
times as they traded from place to place. In recent decades it has been resurrected as a sort of 
international commercial law, which may displace national laws in international transactions. 
As such it has great appeal. The idea of applying national laws in international transactions, 
12 
primarily directed at domestic transactions, to trans-national contracts has always been 
uncomfortable. The better and more attractive approach is to apply international commercial 




The question of the emergence of a new body of law, autonomous, developed in a particular 
community could not develop without being the object of passionate debates. Regarding the Lex 
Mercatoria, those have, mainly, been centered on: 
 
-Whether it constitutes Law; 
 
-Whether it could represent a complete and autonomous legal order; 
 
-Whether its rules could be ascertained in a specific way so as to be applied in practice; 
 




 pointed out, the debate regarding the Lex Mercatoria has gone through different 
stages. At first, the debate was centered on the existence of rules other than those formally 
recognized by an existing legal order, and on the validity of the choice of such other legal rules 
by parties and arbitrators. Presently, with the acceptance as a valid choice by the parties of 
substantive laws regulating transnational contracts, others than national laws, the debate has been 
turned to as whether arbitrators, absent choice of the parties, might choose non-national laws to 
regulate a contractual relationship. 
 
Another focus of the discussion regarding the Lex Mercatoria relates to the difficulty of 
determining its content. Lord Mustill
26
 presented a list of twenty principles
27
, which in his view 
                                                        
24
 Application of the Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial arbitration by Michael Pryles (2003) 
18 International Arbitration Report, page 1.  
25
 Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making? 17(1) Arbitration International, 
p. 54 (2007) by Professor Emmanuel Gaillard  
26
 Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty Five Years (1988). 
27
 Those principles being: 
 
13 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1. A general principle that contract should prima facie be enforced according to their terms: pacta 
sunt servanda. The emphasis given to this maxim in the literature suggests that it is regarded, not 
so much as one of the rules of the lex mercatoria, but as the fundamental principle of the entire 
system. 
 
2. The first general principle is qualified at least in respect of certain long-term contracts by an 
exception akin to rebus sic stantibus. The interaction of the principle and the exception has yet to 
be fully worked out. 
 
3. The first general principle may also be subject to the concept of abus de droit, and to a rule that 
unfair and unconscionable contracts and clauses should not be enforced. 
 
4. There may be a doctrine of culpa in contrahendo. 
 
5.  A contract should be performed in good faith 
 
6.  A contract obtained by bribes or other dishonest means is void, or at least unenforceable. So too 
if the contract creates a fictitious transaction designed to achieve an illegal object. 
 
7.  A State entity cannot be permitted to evade the enforcement of its obligations by denying its own 
capacity to make a binding agreement to arbitrate, or by asserting that the agreement is 
unenforceable for want of procedural formalities to which the entity is subject. 
 
8.  The controlling interest of the group of companies is regarded as contracting on behalf of all 
members of the group, at least so far as concernes an agreement to arbitrate. 
 
9.  If unforeseen difficulties intervene in the performance of a contract, the parties should negotiate 
in good faith to overcome them, even if the contract contains no revision clause. 
 
10. ‘Gold clause’ agreements are valid and enforceable. Perhaps in some cases either a clause or a 
‘hardship’ revision clause may be implied. 
 
11. One party is entitled to treat itself as discharged from its obligations if the other has commited a 
breach, but only if the breach is substantial. 
 
12. No party can be allowed by its own act to bring a non-performance of a condition precedent to its 
own obligation. 
 
13. A tribunal is not bound by the characterization of the contract ascribed to it by the parties. 
 
14. Damages for breach of contract are limited to the foreseeable consequences of the breach. 
 
15. A party which has suffered for a breach of contract must take reasonable steps to mitigate its 
loss. 
 
16. Damages for non-delivery are calculated by reference to the market price of the goods and the 
price at which the buyer has purchased equivalent goods in replacement. 
 
14 
could represent the concept of the Lex Mercatoria. Berger
28
, although not diverging form the 
idea of a list, brought an interesting innovation to its approach introducing the thought that this 
inventory was not an exhaustive one, so that principles contained therein could provide a 
solution for more precise situations. Berger’s list is derived from many sources. He stated: 
 
“The list unifies the various sources that have fostered the evolution of a transnational 
commercial legal system into one single, open-end set of rules and principles: The reception of 
general principles of law, the codification of international trade law by ‘formulating agencies’ 
the case law of international arbitral tribunals, the law-making forces of international model 
contract forms and general conditions of trade, and finally the analisys of comparative legal 
science. Scientific research in this area of highly practical law is of particular relevance because 
many authors of case notes, articles and books on transnational commercial law are themselves 
active in the field of international commercial arbitration.It is therefore not necessary to 
advocate the acceptance and promotion of the efforts of international practice through legal 
doctrine.The often heard prejudice that the lex mercatoria-doctrine is purely theoretical is 
unjustified as long as the list does not only reflect comparative research but also the 
comprehensive cases load of international arbitral tribunals which, in their function as ‘social 
engineers’, play a pivotal role in the evolution of transnational commercial law. It is this 
comprehensive coverage of all possible sources of the lex mercatoria which provides the 




Berger’s inventory comprises seventy eight rules or principles and although it is not our intention 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
17. A party must act promptly to enforce its rights, on pain of losing them by waiver. This may be an 
instance of a more general rule, that each party must act in a diligent and practical manner to 
safeguard its own interests. 
 
18. A debtor may in certain circumstances set off his own cross-claims to extinguish or diminish his 
liability to the creditor. 
 
19. Contracts should be construed according to the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 
 
20. Failure by one party to respond to a letter written to it by the other is regarded as evidence of 
assent to terms. 
 
28
 Klaus Peter Berger, the Creeping codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer International Law). 
29
 Berger, at pp 210-11  
15 




                                                        
30
  Just to enumerate some of the most relevant ones: 
 
1. The parties are free to enter into contracts and to determine their contents (principle of party 
autonomy). 
 
2. the parties must act in accordance with the standard of good fait and fair dealing in international 
trade. 
 
3. A valid contract is binding upon the parties.It can only be modififed or terminated by consent of the 
parties or if provided by law (‘pacta sunt servanda’). 
 
4. The parties are bound by any usages to which they have agreed and by any practice which they have 
established between themselves. Unless agreed otherwise, they are considered to have impliedly 
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have 
known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to 
contract of the type involved in the particular trade concerned. 
 
5. The construction of a contract has to determine the common intention of the parties or, if no such 
intention can be determined, the meaning that reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties 
(average diligent businessmen) would give to it in the same circumstances, taking into account, in 
particular, the nature and purpose of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the meaning 
commonly given to contract terms and expressions in the trade concerned. 
 
6. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or contrary to the intrinsic nature of the contract, time limits 
and other contractual stipulations as to the timely performance of the parties obligations have to be 
strictly complied with (‘time is of the essence’). 
 
7. A party who breaks off negotiations in bad faith (i.e. when the other party was justified in assuming 
that a contract would be concluded) is liable for the losses caused to the other party (‘culpa in 
contrahendo’).  
 
8. A contract that violates boni mores is void (‘fraus omnia corrumpit’). 
 
9. The invalidity of the main contract does not automatically extend to the arbitration clause contain 
therein (principle of separability). 
 
10. If a party is unjustifiably enriched at the expense of another, that party has to pay a sum of money 
equal to the value of the enrichment to be determined according to the contractually agreed price or 
market price, including full compensation for the use ( usufruct) of the subject matter of the 
enrichment (‘nemo sine causa alterius jactura locupletari debet’, ‘conditio indebiti, unjust 
enrichment’). 
 
11. If non-performance of a party is due to an impediment which is beyond the control of that party and 
could not have reasonably been foreseen by that party at the time of conclusion of the contract, such 
as war, civil war, strike, acts of government, accidents, fire, explosions, natural disasters etc., and 
neither the impediment nor its consequences could have been avoided or overcome ( ‘acts of God; 
16 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
‘force majeure’, ‘hohere Gewalt’) that party’s non performance is excused. If non-performance is 
temporary, performance of the contract is suspended during that time and that party is not liable for 
damages to the other party. If the period of non-performance becomes unreasonable and amounts to a 
fundamental non performance, the other party may claim damages and terminate the contract. 
 
12. No one may derive an advantage from his own unlauful acts (‘nullus commodum capere potest de 
iniuria sua propria’). 
 
13. Absent a choice of law by the parties, the contract is governed by the law with which the contract has 
the closest connection (‘center of gravity test’;’engster zusammenhang’;’liens les plus etroits’). 
 
14. If a contract has contacts to more than one jurisdiction and the parties have not agreed on the 
applicable law, it is in the presumed interest of the parties to apply the law, bioth as to form and to 
substance, that validates the contract ( ‘favor negoti;, ‘lex validitatis’, ‘rule of validation’) 
 
15. If an event of legal, economic, technical,political or financial nature occurs after the conclusion of the 
contract which could not reasonably been taken into account by the disadvantaged party at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract and which fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contractual 
obligations, thereby rendering the performance of the contract excessively onerous for that party if 
that party has not, through express stipulation or by the nature of the contract, assumed the risk of that 
event (‘Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage; ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’, ‘hardship’, ‘frustration of 
purpose’), that party may claim renegociation of the contract.If the parties fail to reach agreement 
within reasonable time, either party may apply to a court or arbitral tribunal in order to have the 
contract adapted to the changed circumstances or terminated at a date and on terms to be determined 
by the court or arbitral tribunal. 
 
16. If the parties to a contract are required to render their respective performances simultaneously and 
have not agreed otherwise, each party may withhold performance until tender of performance by the 
other party ( ‘exceptio non adimpleti contractus’). 
 
17. If a party’s failure to perform its obligation amounts to a fundamental non-performance, the other 
party may terminate the contract. Both parties may then claim restitution, in re or in money, of 
whatever they have supplied to the other party.The exceptio non adimpletus contractus rule applies. 
 
18. No one may transfer more rights than he actually has ( nemo plus iure transferre potest quam ipse 
habet). 
 
19. No one may set himself in contradition to his own previous conduct.( ‘non concedit venire contra 
factum proprium’; ‘l’interdiction de se contredire au detriment d’autrui’). 
 
20. A state or state controlled entity may not invoke its sovereignity or internal law to repudiate 
contractual consent. 
 
21. Each party has a good faith obligation to renegociate the contract if there is a need to adapt the 
contract to changed circumstances and the continuation of performance can reasonable be expected 
from the parties. 
 
22. Each party is under a good faith obligation to notify the other party of any problems that occur in the 
performance of the contract and to cooperate with the other party when such cooperation can 
reasonably be expected for the performance of that party’s obligations. 
17 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
23. If the contract does not contain a provision fixing the price or a method for determing it, the parties 
are able to be treated as having agreed to the price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract for such performance in comparable circumstances in the trade concerned, or, if no such 
price is available, to a reasonable price. 
 
24. Where an agent acts on behalf of a principal within the scope of his authority which has been granted 
to him expressly or can be implied from the circumstances of the case, for example by a refernce to a 
contract of comission, that the agent undertakes to bind himself only. 
 
25. A corporate entity acting on behalf of a group of corporate entities binds all entities that belong to the 
group. 
 
26. The principal is not bound if an agent acts without or outside his authority (falsus procurator) unless 
he ratifies, expressly or impliedly through his conduct, the acts of the agent. In the latte case, the act 
produces the same effects as if it has initially been carried out with authority. 
 
27. Where the conduct of the principal causes the third party reasonable and in good faith to believe that 
the agent has authority to act on behalf of the principal and the agent is acting within the scope of that 
authority, the principal may not invoke agaisnt the thrid party the lack of authority of the agent 
(‘agency by estoppel’, ‘ Anscheinsvollmacht’) 
 
28. Facts which the agent knows or ought to have known are attributable to the principal. 
 
29. There is a presumption for the professional competence of the parties to an international commercial 
contract.The parties may therefore not argue that they were not aware of the significance of the 
contractual obligations to which they have agreed. 
 
30. Specialised laws prevail over general laws (‘lex specialis derogat legi general’). 
 
31. The burden of proof rests on the claimant viz.On the party who advances a proposition affirmatively 
(‘actori incumbit probatio’). 
 
32. A written contract may be proved through any means of modern telecommunication (telex, Telefax, 
btx, EDI etc), if it provides a record of the information contained therein and can be reproduced in 
writeen form. 
 
33. Damages may not exceed the actual loss and are available only for loss which is proved by the 
claimant. 
 
34. A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the 
circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If it fails to take 
such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the 
loss should have been mitigated. 
 
35. Principle of ‘piercing the corporate viel’in international corporate law in case of clear under-
capitalisation and a mingling of corporate and financial spheres, especially in case of total control of 
the parent company over the business and financial affairs of its subsidiary. 
 
36. In case of corporate de-facto succession liability continues. 
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A different approach to determine the Lex Mercatoria’s content has been presented by Gaillard
31
. 
In his perspective, even though the list method comprising the general rules of the Lex 
Mercatoria cannot be denied, a more “scientific” method to determine its content would be more 
adequate. This technique would be based on the “existence of a number of international treaties 
which, whether in force or not, reflect a broad consensus, by the incresingly large number of 
published awards providing as large number of precedents to international arbitrators and by 





In practice, arbitrators should follow three steps. At first, attention shall be given to parties intent 
in particular whether they have laid down a method, e.g. limiting the possibility of analysis to 
particular legal systems. Second, arbitrators shall determine whether  allegations made by parties 
are based on an accepted rule or just rely on a particular aspect of a given legal order.Third, to 
determine the acceptance of the general principle of law determined according to the principles 
seth above, unanimity is not required. The comparative analysis of Gaillard, based primarily on 
the parties intent, reflects the concept of transnational commercial arbitration, which shall find its 
sources in general principles of law and accepts as one of its most important principles the 
parties intent (pacta sunt servanda).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
37. A state may not nationalise or expropriate foreign private investment except for a purpose which is in 
the public interest, not discriminatory, carried out under due process of law and against ‘appropriate’ 
compensation. 
 
38. Absent an agreement of the parties, if a goig concern is expropriated, the amount of compensation is 
to be determined immediately before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision to take the 
asset became publicly known (‘full compensation standard’). 
 
39. Payment of compensation shall include interest and has to be made ‘effectively’, i.e. in freely 
controvertible currency on the basis of the market rate of exchange existing for that currency on the 
valuation date or in any other currency accepted by the investor, and ‘prompt’, i.e. without undue 
delay or, in case of establishing foreign exchange stringencies, by payment in installments within a 
period which will be as short as possible not exceeding five years from the time of taking. 
 
31
 Gaillard, Emmanuel, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making? 17(1) 
Arbitration International, page 54, 2007. 
32
 Gaillard, page 63. 
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A final word must be said regarding a quite innovative perspective as regards the assessment of 
the Lex Mercatoria which has been proposed by Dalhuisen
33
 . In his understanding, the 
determination of the content of the Lex Mercatoria is based on the need to assess a configuration 
which would in any case provide an answer. Such organization exists in the Lex Mercatoria, is as 
complete as any domestic legal order and would have the following sources: 
 
(a) Fundamental legal principle; 
(b) Mandatory custom; 
(c) Mandatory uniform treaty law (to the extent applicable under its own scope rules); 
(d) Mandatory general principle; 
(e) Party autonomy; 
(f) Directory custom; 
(g) Directory uniform treaty law (to the extent applicable under its own scope rules); 
(h) General principles largely derived from comparative law, uniform treaty law (even where 
not directly applicable or not sufficiently ratified), ICC rules and the Like; 
(i) Residually, domestic laws found through conflict of law rules. 
 
As to the fundamental legal notions or principles of private or transactional law which come 
first and form the basis of the whole system, they are: 
 
(a) pacta sunt servanda as the essence of contract law; 
(b) the recognition, transferability and substantial protection of ownership to be respected by 
all as the essence of all property; 
(c) the liability for own action, especially: 
(i) if wrongful (certainly if the wrong is of major nature) as the essence of tort law; 
(ii) If leading to detrimental reliance on such action by others as another fundamental source 
of contract law;  
(iii) if creating the appearance of authority in others as an essential of the law of (indirect) 
agency; or 
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(iv) if resulting in owners creating an appearance of ownership in others as an additional 
fundamental principal in the law of property leading to the protection of the bona fide 
purchaser (setting aside the more traditional nemo dat principle). 
 
There are other fundamental principles in terms of: 
 
(d) apparent authority and fiduciary duties leading to special protections of counterparties, 
notably if weaker or in a position of dependence (including principles) against agents, 
consumers against wholesalers, workers against employers, individuals against the state, 
smaller investors against brokers). And to duties of disclosure and faith full 
implementation of one’s contractual and other obligations; 
(e) unjust enrichment; 
(f) respect for acquired or similar rights, traditionally particularly relevant to outlaw 
retroactive government intervention, but also used to support owners of proprietary 
rights in assets that move to other countries; 
(g) equality of treatment between creditors, shareholders and other classes of interested 
parties with similar rights unless they have postponed themselves. 
 
Then there are:  
 
(h) fundamental procedural protections in terms of impartiality, proper jurisdiction, proper 
hearings and the possibility to mount an adequate defense, now often related to the more 
recent (and also internationalised) standards of human rights and basic protections 
(i) fundamental protections against fraud, Sharp practices, excessive powers, cartels, 
bribery and insider dealings or other forms of manipulation in market-related assets 
(also in their civil and commercial aspects) and against money laundering; 
(j) transaction and payment finality, equally demanded by the transnational public order 
itself; and finally 




C. In Summary 
 
From the analisys above exposed, one can understand that the development of a substantive 
“transnational commercial law” in transborder contractual relations is a hotly debated matter. It 
is justified by the possibilities that it opens
34
, and the questions it brings with
35
. Currently, no 
generally accepted definition of Transnational Law exists nor a common understanding of how 
to determine its content prevails. Nevertheless, what it cannot be denied is that  even though 
those questions are still unsettled, Transnational Law and  the new Lex Mercatoria found special 
ground in international commercial arbitration modifying its character and bringing with it a new 
dimension. 
III. Transnational Arbitration  
 
A. Why Transnationalize? 
 
The question of transnational commercial arbitration only arises if, and to the extent that, this 
“transnationalisation” would be beneficial to the existing “understanding” of international 
arbitration. Those benefits would have to serve the interests of the different actors in the arbitral 
process, essentially those of the parties that opted for arbitration but nevertheless coexist with the 
existing framework, which established the legal basis of Commercial Arbitration. 
 
From this point of view, Transnational Arbitration would represent the evolution of International 
Commercial Arbitration aiming at better serving the interests of its participants. It shall be 
noticed that the Transnationalisation of Commercial Arbitration, in our understanding, should be 
also interpreted as a consequence of the phenomenon that first started with the concept of 
Transnational Law. It becomes obvious, therefore, that many of the questions that aroused 
regarding Transnational Law would become problematic in the realm of transnational arbitration. 
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To begin with and the most simple of them would therefore be: What is Transnational 
Arbitration? 
 
B. The Concept 
 
It is not an easy task to properly articulate the concept of Transnational Arbitration. It seems that 
no clear distinction is made between International Commercial Arbitration on the one side and 





 present themselves or refer to Transnational Commercial Arbitration and International 
Commercial Arbitration without any apparent distinction. 
 
As previously affirmed, “Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution in which the parties agree to 
submit their differences to a third party or a tribunal for a binding decision”. In this sense, 
traditionally its legal sources are to be found in international conventions, national legislation 
and private institution’s rules. Therefore, it has originally a transnational legal nature. This 
transnational original legal nature may be identified through the analysis of the definition of 
Transnational Law. Going back to Jessup’s approach,” “transnational law” (shall) include all 
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private 
international laws are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard 
categories. 
 
Following Jessup’s rationale, it is evident that “international commercial arbitration” gathers all 
the components of transnationality. It finds its legal basis in International Public Law, the New 
York Convention being the “pierre angulaire” of the all system but also in national law 
essentially through domestic Lex Arbitri and national court’s rulings. However, due to the 
participation of private actors and the development of its own rules and principles (e.g. 
separability of the arbitration clause, competence competence, Uncitral Rules on Arbitration, 
ICC rules) commercial arbitration cannot be defined as existing independently in the legal sphere 
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37
 See above 10. 
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of Public International Law nor particularly in the legal sphere of domestic Law nor even in the 
realm of private/party autonomy.  
 
More transnational aspects of commercial arbitration can be identified if we reanalyze the 
definition provided above of transnational law. As stated: 
 
“Transnational law might be understood as being  “ law (which) created and developed by the 
law making forces of a global civil society: (1) It is based on (a) general principles of law, 
derived from a functional comparative analysis of the “common core” of domestic legal systems, 
and (b) on the usages and customs of the international business community as expressed in 
standard contract forms and general business conditions, (2) it is administered and developed by 
private providers of alternative dispute resolution, and (3) it is enforced predominantly by virtue 
of social sanctions such as reputation and exclusion. Finally (4) its rules are codified – if at all – 
in the form of lists of principles, standard contract forms, or codes of conduct proposed by 
private norm entrepreneurs”. 
 
Through this conception, it appears that many of the ideas expressed hereby are also present 
within the theory of a transnationalized arbitration. Those ideas being: 
 
1- Transnational arbitration has been developed according to the needs of a particular 
society (financial and commercial); 
 
2- It reflects general principles of law, which can derive from the analysis of the “tronc 
commun” of domestic legal systems; 
 
3- It is enforced essentially through social sanctions such as reputation and exclusion; 
4-  Its rules and/or codes of conduct are predominantly developed by private institutions 
(arbitration rules such as Uncitral Arbitration Rules, ICC Rules). 
 
The difficulty in properly assessing transnational arbitration, is increased due to the different 
understandings of this concept since the term transnational arbitration finds different meanings in 
24 
commercial arbitration literature, in some instances authors refer to a-national arbitration, 




a) Delocalized Arbitration 
 
Before analyzing the concept of delocalized arbitrations, a word shall be said regarding 
arbitrations under the ICSID
39
. Even though those arbitrations relate to investment disputes, and 
the parties involved in the arbitral process are State or State entities on the one side and investors 





The Washington Convention of 1965 establishes the creation of an arbitral forum for the 
resolution of disputes between investors and states. Particulars (which under the ICSID accept 





(i) There is a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment; 
 
(ii) Both contracting states are parties to the ICSID Convention; 
 
(iii) Both the host state and the investor have consented to arbitration. 
 
Following the above, a particular may submit a dispute with a State in the case that both his State 
of origin and the host State are parties to the Washington Convention, if there is a BIT which 
“covers” the investment and therefore permits a party to submit a dispute to the arbitral 
institution and if, there is a dispute related with the investment. 
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 edition 1.196 
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 Article 25 of the Washington Convention. 
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Arbitrations regulated by the Washington Convention find their legal basis on Public 
International Law (Washington Convention and BIT’s) that confers a total degree of autonomy 
regarding domestic legal orders. This autonomy has two different implications, namely that (i) 
ICSID awards can only be revised or annulled under ICSID’s own internal procedures and (ii) 
contracting States have the obligation to recognize and enforce ICSID awards as if they were a 




BIT’s do not provide for an applicable law as substantive law in cases of dispute, and those who 
provide usually refer to international law and domestic law, without an explanation of how they 
should be combined in practice
43
. In investment arbitration, usually, practice confers a primordial 
role to principles of International Law without excluding the relevance of domestic law. This 
interplay between domestic and international law is exemplified through the statement of the 
arbitral tribunal in CMS V Argentina: 
 
“A more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach has emerged allowing of the application of 
both domestic law and international law if the specific facts of the dispute so justifies. It is no 
longer the case of one prevailing over the other and excluding it altogether. Rather, both sources 




Remarkably, arbitration under the ICSID has in its legal nature some of the most important 
components of the idea of a transnational arbitration. The first one would result from the fact that 
those arbitrations are not “anchored” in any particular domestic system, being therefore totally 
delocalized and the second one results from the combined approach between international law 
and domestic law, as regards the substantive law in case of disputes. Through this particular 
combination, one could see the genesis of a “transnational law” applicable to the BIT’s involving 
both international and domestic law. 
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 Arbitration for Sports Law 
 
International arbitration in sports legal system provides another singular example of truly 
delocalized arbitration. For disputes arising between different actors within the international 
sports legal system (ISF’s, athletes competing at international level, or other actors
45
), arbitration 
under the CAS is in the vast majority of cases, the dispute resolution mechanism at the 
disposition of the parties. As McLaren
46
 correctly pointed out  “[CAS] provides a forum for the 
world’s athletes and sports federations to resolve disputes through a single, independent and 
accomplished sports adjudication body that is capable of consistently applying the rules of 
different sport organizations and the worldwide rules of the [Olympic Movement and the anti-
doping movement]”. 
 
The CAS has its headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland. Its jurisdiction derives from agreements 
between the parties to submit their disputes to the jurisdiction of this institution. All arbitrations, 
regardless of their actual location, have as the place of the seat Switzerland being therefore 
totally delocalized and having Swiss Law as the Lex Arbitri. Accordingly, CAS awards may only 
be reviewed by Swiss Federal Tribunals. Having as place of the seat Switzerland also implies 
that for other states, CAS awards are “foreign” under the New York Convention and therefore, 
those awards may be recognized and enforced in any country that has ratified the Convention. 
 
 Delocalised Commercial  Arbitrations 
 
Delocalised commercial arbitrations rely on the idea that commercial arbitrations find their legal 
basis on the principle of party autonomy and exist without being “anchored” in any particular 
domestic legal order. This is particularly the case in international arbitration, where the place of 
the seat (and therefore its lex arbitri) has been chosen for its neutrality and that the parties may: 
 
-Choose a procedural law, independent from any domestic legal system; 
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-Settle on their procedural rules, independent from those of the place of the seat; 
 
-Decide their substantive law (which can be a non-national law). 
 
The legal relation between the place of the seat and the arbitral process, which is taking place in 
its territory, becomes the more often a matter of convenience since “most arbitrations are 
conducted without any reference to the law that governs them
47
”. As a consequence, the only 
relevant place of control of an international award should be at the place of enforcement, 
detaching the arbitration from control of the place of the seat. In practice, commercial 
arbitrations cannot be understood as totally detached from any given legal order since, they rely 
on domestic legal orders for matters of enforcement and recognition and also in what it relates to 




More than a concept of transnational arbitration, delocalized arbitrations can be understood as a 
feature of commercial arbitration that might be useful in cases of annulment of an award at the 
place of the seat. A good illustration of this possibility is the Chromalloy
49
 award in which an 
Egyptian court annulled an award made in Cairo in favor of a US corporation and the award was 
granted recognition and enforcement by the US District Court in Washington, DC. Another 
example where such a feature might be useful happens when local courts seek to prevent arbitral 
tribunals from carrying out their duty by issuing anti suit injunctions. This is particularly the case 
where one of the parties seeks support from a court to delay or stay proceedings (In this case, 
arbitral tribunals might carry on their mission by delocalizing the arbitration). 
Transnational arbitration is also referred, in commercial arbitration literature, as autonomous 
arbitration
50
. In this perspective, there would exist an autonomous arbitral legal order, 
independent from any domestic one
51
. 
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b) Autonomous Arbitration 
 The Lex Sportiva 
 
The emergence of autonomous private legal orders has not been exclusive to the realm of 
commercial and financial communities. One of the most proeminent debates around the 
possibility of the existence of an autonomous legal order has been raised in the domain of 
“Sports Law” under the designation of “Lex Sportiva”. For the analysis presented herein, a 
summary assessment of the Lex Sportiva becomes relevant due to the analogies made between 
the Lex Mercatoria and the former. 
 
The existence of a Lex Sportiva as an autonomous legal order remains substance of discussion 
between scholars
52
. It has even been defended that sports legal system, does not exist as a 
singular entity but is composed by several distinct “micro” legal systems
53
. This is the present 
understanding of Thomas Schultz
54
, for whom the existence of leges sportivae can be ascertained 
through the existence of legislative, jurisdictional and executionnary competences. 
 
The legislative competence would be demonstrated through the normative activity (e.g. rules, 
regulations) of the different private institutions (international federations, national sports bodies) 
within sports communities. The jurisdictional competence would be demonstrated through the 
submission of the disputes, within the community, to the arbitral dispute resolution mechanisms, 
which as we saw above, might find in the CAS a de facto Supreme Court. The executionnary 
competence would be inherent to the possibility of the exclusion of an athlete, or even of a 
national sport association in case of non-compliance or violation of the rules set by the private 
actors within the community. 
 
As the debate around the existence, or its non-existence, goes on in the scholar field, in practice 
it seems undeniable that a body of substantive law has emerged in the sports system. Lorenzo 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
51
For a convergent view see: (2006) 22 Arbitration International, Julian D.M. Lew QC Achieving the 
Dream: Autonomous Arbitration. 
52
 For a convergent view see: A. RIGOZZI, L’arbitrage international en matière de sport, Bâle, Helbing 
& Lichtenhahn, 2005, § 1248: 
53
 For a convergent view see Thomas Schultz, JusLetter du 20 février 2006. 
54




 points out that a “global sports law” has emerged, which embraces the whole complex 
of norms produced and implemented by regulatory sporting regimes. It includes not only 
transnational norms set by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and by International 
Federations (IFs) – i.e. “the principles that emerge from the rules and regulations of 
international sporting federations as a private contractual order” –, but also “hybrid” public-
private norms approved by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and international law (such 
as the UNESCO Convention against doping in sport). Global sports law is made of norms 
provided by central sporting institutions (such as IOC, IFs and WADA) and by national sporting 
bodies (such as National Olympic Committees and National Anti-Doping Organizations). 
 
This substantive body of law has been increasingly developed through the action of the CAS 
which behaves as an administrative court, when deciding disputes arising out of Sports 
institutions decisions, a criminal court, in matters of doping nature, a civil court, in questions of 
commercial nature and even a constitutional court, when analyzing disputes between institutions 




Due to the activity of the CAS, its influence can be ascertained in the legal fields above 
enumerated by: 
 
- Developing common legal principles (CAS awards either refer to common legal 
principles
57
 or even create new principles
58
 when referring to the so called principia 
sportiva); 
 
- Interpreting sports law and influencing rulemaking (the role of the CAS in the 
interpretation of Sports Law has become even more structured and important in the last 
decades through the emergence of a de facto rule of precedent
59
); 
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- Harmonizing global norms through the appeals procedure (being constituted by two 
divisions, the Ordinary Arbitration division, who has the task to resolve disputes 
submitted to ordinary procedure and the Appeals Arbitration Division, who has the task 
to resolve disputes concerning the decisions of federations, associations or other sports- 
related bodies, as long as the statutes or regulations of these institutions or a specific 
agreement provides for, the CAS represents an original system within the realm of 
arbitration). It shall be noticed that the appeals procedure provided for by the CAS, 
denotes an opportunity for the latter to review both the facts and the law of the dispute 
and therefore issue a new decision, which might either replace the challenged decision or 
annul it and refer the case back to the previous instance
60
. The appeals procedure is 
available both for international disputes (involving ISF’s and national sportbodies or 
athletes) and for “domestic” disputes as long as an ad hoc clause or a specific agreement 
so determines. 
 
Through this complex system, “CAS acts like a supreme court playing a significant role in 
harmonizing global sports law”
61
 both at the transnational level and at the national level. 
 
A final word shall be said regarding the relation between the CAS and national institutions. In 
the accomplishment of its mission, the CAS may even be called to pronounce itself over public 
bodies’ decisions. This situation has been dealt with in two distinct manners: in Italy, for 
instance, a specific provision establishes that doping sanctions issued by the national anti-doping 
tribunal (a public body) can be appealed to the CAS. In other circumstances, the CAS itself has 
resolved the matter, by simply ignoring the domestic decision
62
. 
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After having reviewed the main principles and ideas of Arbitration within Sports Legal system, 
through analogy reasoning, analyzing commercial and financial arbitration as an autonomous 
arbitration, might allow us to bring a shed of light as regards the concept of Transnational 
Arbitration. 
 
 Transnational Arbitration, An Autonomous Legal Order? 
 
The justification of the existence of an autonomous legal within the commercial and financial 
legal order is based on the following ideas: 
 
- Commercial’s arbitration legal nature is a sui generis one; 
 
- Commercial Arbitration assembles all the characteristics of any legal order; 
 
- The autonomy of this legal order is demonstrated by the fact that an award set aside by a 
given court can be recognized in another state; 
 
-  The arbitral tribunals are not bound by any anti suit injunctions nor even by the “lois de 
police of a state”; 
 
- The applicability of a non-national law, as substantive law of the main contract, also 
demonstrates its autonomous character; 
 
- The existence of a transnational public legal order that shall be respected in any case. 
 
A few words shall be said regarding the ideas above referred. 
 
Arbitration’s legal nature remains an unsettled matter among scholars. Different opinions have 
been defended but no common ground has been found. Nevertheless, the most important ones 
32 
could be understood as being the territorialist thesis, the pluralistic thesis, the autonomous thesis 
and the contractual thesis. 
 
As for the territoralist or traditional thesis, which has seen, perhaps due to an incorrect 
understanding of the analysis presented, Mann
63
 as one of the most preeminent defendants of 
such an approach, the concept would consist in the idea that every arbitration is a national 
arbitration, that is to say, subject to a specific system of law”
64
. It seems nonetheless that this 
thesis has been abandoned, since its approach was more accurate and adapted to a complete 
outdated reality. As pointed out by Paulsson
65
 “One can understand the territorialist model as a 
product of attitudes prevailing until the middle of the 20th century. Is simply does not fit the 
realities of an international society no longer constrained within national units: a world in which 
moreover national legal systems understand this new flux.”  
 
The pluralistic thesis, which finds also in Paulsson
66
 one of its most pronounced defenders, is 
based on the understanding that arbitrations find their legitimacy on a multitude of legal orders 
that might intervene in the arbitral process. Opponents of the pluralistic thesis, in particular 
Gaillard, point to the difficult and inconsistency that it would represent to operate in such a vast 
and unpredictable environment. 
 
It is also Gaillard
67
, who is one of the most productive and representative partisans of the 
autonomous thesis, following which arbitration would find its legitimacy in an autonomous 
arbitral legal order, separate form any national or domestic legal system. Criticism regarding this 
approach focuses on its inability to bring any element which was not produced by the pluralistic 
thesis
68
 and in the difficulty of determining the existence of “private” legal orders. 
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The “contractual thesis” has been, in particular, defended by Von Mehren
69
. Following this 
understanding, since arbitration is the result of the expression of the parties intent through 
contract, its legitimacy is rooted in the autonomy of the parties
70
.It shall be noticed that the 
existence of a principle such as Competence Competence does not leave much room for an 
extensive analysis of this thesis, the arbitrators having the possibility of determining their 
competence in case of uncertainty regarding the existence of the arbitral agreement being a 
severe handicap to the defense of party autonomy has the legitime source of arbitration. 
 
Commercial Arbitration assembles all the characteristics of any legal order 
71
. Those 
characteristics would refer to: 
 
- Its own subjects and institutions (there is an identifiable financial and commercial community 
which is subject, even though by express consent, to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals); 
 
- Completeness (a genuine legal order has the capacity to provide an answer to any legal issue 
that arises between the parties). While referring to the completeness of the system of arbitral 
tribunals it is often question of the structure of the Lex Mercatoria. As previously noticed, it 
seems to exist an interrelation between the genesis of the Lex Mercatoria and the existence of a 
separate and autonomous arbitral legal order. Therefore, the methodology developed to identify 
the rules of Law that would characterize the Lex Mercatoria are also applicable to the 
identification of the rules of the arbitral legal order
72
. As above stated, this methodology could 
consist in a functional comparative analysis of the “common core” of domestic legal systems, 
and on the usages and customs of the international business community as expressed in standard 
contract forms and general business conditions; 
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-Structured Character. Another specificity of a legal system is its logical interrelation and its 
hierarchy between the norms that exist in such a system. In this aspect if we would go back to the 
interrelation between the Lex Mercatoria and the idea of an arbitral legal order one can deduct 
that, as affirmed in the analysis of the Lex Mercatoria based on the understanding of Dalhuisen, 
“modern Lex Mercatoria is not more incomplete than any domestic law and is thus fully 




-The evolving character of the norms of any given legal order is also understood as one of its 
distinguishing features as opposed to mere “rules of law”. Any given genuine legal order is 
supposed to have the capacity to adapt itself to the evolution of the needs of its community.  
 
The norms developed in the arbitral legal order, be it through case law or due to the action of 
“private actors” reflect the needs of the parties. The faculty of adapting rules of procedure to any 
given case, the possibility of the application of substantive rules decided by the parties are only a 
few examples of this character. Which is more, going back to the idea that the norms of the 
arbitral legal order derive either from a list or from a method, also represent an example of this 
character knowing that from the perspective of Berger 
74
 this list would not be a closed one and 





through the methodology approach, those norms would be also updated according to the needs 
expressed.  
 
It should be noticed that, even though, in arbitration a considerable confidential aspect, which 
may represent an obstacle to the proliferation and debate of the different solutions provided by 
arbitrators, is always present, and that arbitrators are not bound by any doctrine of “precedent” 
nor “stare decisis
77
”, arbitration has developed its own principles (separability of the arbitration 
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clause, Competence Competence) according to the needs expressed. From this analysis the 
evolving character of the norms of an “autonomous arbitral legal order” are undeniable. 
 
- Following a research study
78
 90% of the arbitral awards are spontaneously executed. The main 
justification of this effective character would consist in the possibility of an exclusion of the 
community and therefore, the loss of confidence of the other “participants”. Accordingly, the 
issue of its effectiveness becomes irrelevant. 
 
-The autonomy of this legal order is also demonstrated by the fact that an award set aside by a 
given court can be recognized in another state. As it was previously demonstrated, this is the 
particularly the case of delocalized commercial arbitrations. 
 
The arbitral tribunals are not bound by any anti suit injunctions nor have a duty ex officio to 
apply mandatory rules of law (to use the french expression les “lois de police”). “A mandatory 
rule (loi de police in French) is an imperative provision of law, which must be applied to an 
international relationship irrespective of the law that governs that relationship”
79
. The 
applicability of the mandatory provisions of law derives from their nature, as not being subject to 
party autonomy. Due to the territoriality principle, these provisions are applicable per se to a 
given subject matter even if the parties of a contractual relationship (i) ignored their existence, 
and therefore it was not their intent to find their relationship governed by such rules or (ii) 
expressly derogated the applicability of such provisions. 
 
The question of the applicability of mandatory provisions of law in arbitral tribunals may arise 
through different circumstances: 
 
i) Do arbitrators have authority to apply mandatory rules of law? (Knowing that arbitrators do 
not have a Lex Fori) 
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ii) Should the arbitrators apply these provisions ex-officio? 
 
iii) Which mandatory rules of law should they apply? 
 
As regards the arbitrators’ authority to apply mandatory rules of law, it seems that, presently, the 
answer would generally be positive. As we shall see further in this analysis, through the 
expansion of the domain of the “objective arbitrability” disputes involving the applicability of 
mandatory provisions of law have ceased to be exclusive jurisdiction of domestic courts. 
Regarding the arbitrators duty to apply mandatory rules of law, it would be more difficult to 
provide a definitive answer since arbitrators may even not be aware of the existence of such rules 
and if not invoked directly by the parties, the arbitrator cannot introduce an issue of validity 
which has not been raised by litigants. Nevertheless, a positive answer shall be admitted if and to 
the extent that the Lex contractus comprehends the mandatory rule or one of the parties invokes 
the applicability of the mandatory rule. In the other cases, namely the situation where the 
mandatory rule is not part of the lex contractus the situations seems to be dealt as follows:  
 
(i) Arbitral tribunals take into account the mandatory provision, without applying it because it is 
unnecessary to do so
80
 or (ii) arbitral tribunals apply exclusively the Lex Contractus
81
 or (iii) 
arbitral tribunals, consider the nature of the mandatory rule and if there “exists a definite 
connecting factor between the dispute and the state which promulgated the rule in question, 




-The applicability of a non-national law, as substantive law, also demonstrates its autonomous 
character. In International arbitration, it is presently clear that parties enjoy a wide autonomy to 
submit their contractual relationship to a law or body of rules they deem appropriate, whether 
this choice consist on a national law or a “non national law” (one could think here about the Lex 
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Mercatoria). However, in cases where parties have failed to do so, arbitrators have the obligation 
to decide on their behalf what law or body of rules should be applied. This decision is therefore a 
matter of extreme importance for the parties and for the tribunal. 
 
Due to the fact that arbitral tribunals do not have a lex fori, traditional approach based on 
ascertaining the applicable law through conflict of laws can be problematic. Also, since each 
state has its own conflict of laws, and knowing that they may differ from one state to another, 
submitting the determination of the applicable law to a contract, in cases where states would 
have different conflicts of laws, could result in different laws applying subject only to the 
difference of the place of the seat. In international arbitration this does not seem an adequate 
solution. As Redfern and Hunter pointed out “This has led to the formulation of a doctrine that 
has found support both in the rules of arbitral institutions and in the practice of international 
arbitration, namely that, an international arbitral tribunal is not bound to follow the conflict of 




Accordingly, Model Law Article 28 provides the following: 
 
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are 
chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Any designation of the law or 
legal system of a given State shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring 
to the substantive law of that State and not to its conflict of laws rules. 
 
(2) Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by 
the conflict of laws rules that it considers applicable. 
 
In this case, the reference to the application of the “Law determined by the conflict of law rules 
which it considers applicable” seems to exclude the possibility to select any non national body of 
rules even though arbitral tribunal still have the possibility to decide the “conflict of laws rules” 
it considers applicable. 
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The same rationale seems to have been adopted in English Arbitration Act 1996, which provides 
that: 
 
46 (1) the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute: 
 
(a) In accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the 
dispute, or 
 
(b) If the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are agreed by 
them or determined by the tribunal. 
 
(2) For this purpose the choice of the laws of a country shall be understood to refer to the 
substantive laws of that country and not its conflict of laws rules. 
 
(3) If or to the extent that there is no such choice or agreement, the tribunal shall apply the 
law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 
 
It seems clear that English Arbitration Act followed Model Law’s approach in conferring on the 
one side a wide discretion to the parties in the choice of “non national laws”, but limiting the 
arbitrator’s choice to a particular Law (which could a priori exclude any non national law). 
 
As opposed to the understanding of the provisions above, ICC Rules seem to adopt a different 
approach. Article 17 provides that: 
1) The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal 
to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate. 
 
2) In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provisions of the contract and the 
relevant trade usages. 
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It seems is that the intention of the ICC Rules is to go a step further of what is provided by the 
Model Law, in explicitly allowing arbitrators to apply “the Rules of Law which it determines to 
be appropriate”. Moreover, number 2 of the relevant article also expressly enunciates the 
possibility of taking into account “the relevant trade usages”. This is also the approach followed 
by French lex arbitri
84
 which allows, as regards the merits of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal to 
settle the dispute by applying the “rules of law” that the parties have chosen or, absent such 
choice, that the tribunal deems suitable. Tribunal shall also take into account trade usages.  
 
Although some model rules or national lex arbitri seem to “tussle” with the idea of allowing 
arbitrators to decide a dispute, in case parties did not provide a “lex contractus”, at their own 
initiative based on “non-national laws”, for others this does not seem problematic nor 
unreasonable. Moreover, it seems that by acting in such a way, these legislations demonstrate an 
increased transnationalisation of international commercial arbitration. 
 
If for purposes of determining applicable law to the subject matter dispute, international 
arbitration framework and practice seems to be settled, the question is quite different in what it 
relates to the determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, where the parties 
have failed to do so. Also it would be interesting to analyze, if and to what extent, could the 
arbitration agreement be subject to “non national law” either by the initiative of the parties or, 
where the parties have failed to do so, through the initiative of the arbitrators. 
 
The issue of determining the applicable Law to the arbitration agreement is a consequence of the 
principle of separability of the arbitration clause. As already discussed, in international 
commercial arbitration, the arbitration agreement is a separate agreement of the main contract. 
Therefore, the choice of law clause of the main agreement does not apply to the arbitration 
agreement, except if the parties expressly agree so. Given that the arbitral tribunal has no Lex 
fori, it cannot rely on pre-established conflict of law rules to determine the applicable law. Since 
the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, in principle, would not be extended to the main 
contract and since the arbitrators have no lex fori, what solutions would be available to them? 
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A reasonable assumption would consist in relying in the law of the place of seat. Nevertheless as 
Berger pointed out “(…) only very few of these arbitration laws contain specific conflict rules for 
the determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement by the arbitral tribunal. 
Those conflict rules that deal with this issue are concerned with the determination of the 
applicable law by the courts in setting aside and enforcement proceedings
85
”. Which is more, 
since arbitral tribunals have no Lex fori there is no obligation for the arbitral tribunals to 
determine the applicable law to the arbitration agreement based on conflict of law rules of the 




 also defends, “(…) It is fair to say that today, the conflict rule contained in 
Art. V (1) (a) New York Convention, Art. VI (a) and (b) European Convention, in Arts. 34(2) (a) 
(i) and 36(1) (a) (i) UNCITRAL Model Law, Sect. 1059(2) 1.a) and 1060(2) German Arbitration 
Act, Art. 1073 Dutch Arbitration Act, and Sect. 48 Swedish Arbitration Act has developed into a 
truly transnational conflict rule for the determination of the law governing the substantive 
validity of the arbitration agreement. This rule has been applied in numerous international 
arbitral awards, is favored by international arbitral doctrine and has been accepted by domestic 
courts”. 
 
Following this rule, and due to the territoriality principle, and also derived from the fact that 
arbitrators, who would not follow this approach, might end up finding their awards being set 
aside or annulled by courts either at place of the seat or at the place of the enforcement, in cases 
where the parties did not expressly mentioned the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, 
applicability of the law of the seat prevail. A remarkable exception shall be mentioned regarding 
this conclusion. For French courts, the existence and scope of the arbitration agreement depends 
only on the parties’ discernible common intention. Consequently, under French lex arbitri 
arbitrators are not bound, for the determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, 
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“By virtue of a substantive rule of international arbitration, the arbitration agreement is legally 
independent of the main contract containing or referring to it, and the existence and 
effectiveness of the arbitration agreement are to be assessed, subject to the mandatory rules of 
French law and international public policy, on the basis of the parties’ common intention, there 
being no need to refer to any national law”. 
 
It shall be noticed that many authors have criticized this approach. As an example, for Berger 
this attitude would consist in an “unnecessary exaggeration of transnationalism”
88
, as regards 
its implications, in particular the abandonment of a traditional determination of the applicable 
law through conflict of laws rules, and the possibility of extrapolating the parties will. It shall 
nonetheless be noticed that, in our opinion, there is no legal obstacle to this approach. The 
conflict rule derived from the New York Convention
89
, which we can also find in the Model 
Law
90
, establishes that: 
 
An arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if: The said agreement is not valid under the 
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
State (where the award was made). This provision does not establish that the award shall be 
made according to a particular national law to be recognized has valid by the law of the seat, nor 
that arbitrators shall decide, if the parties did not provide for a specific law of the arbitration 
agreement, on any national given law. 
 
The French example provides us with a gateway to the transnationalization of the arbitration 
agreement that, in our view shall not be neglected. Also, It shall not be forgotten that 
international arbitration is becoming more and more independent from domestic legal systems 
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and that the relation between the place of the seat and the arbitral process is becoming more and 
more a question of convenience, rather than a question of legal determination. 
 
C. In Summary 
 
A few conclusions can be drawn up from the reasonings above. In first place, the concept of 
transnational arbitration can be understood as the detachment of the arbitral process from any 
particular domestic legal order. This is demonstrated by the growing autonomy of commercial 
arbitration as regards municipal laws and state intervention but also through the emergence of a 
genuine body of substantive law, namely the Lex Mercatoria. 
 
In second place, when compared with arbitration for investment or sport disputes, commercial 
arbitration seems to be acquiring more and more the features and characteristics of those dispute 
mechanisms. Therefore, by analogy and if the transnational character of those dispute resolution 
mechanisms would be acceptable in their realm, as autonomous, commercial arbitration might 
also be understood as a transnational concept. 
 
Understanding commercial arbitration, as a transnational concept, shall also be analyzed within 
the reformulation of the legal process, happening at the global level. The State is not anymore at 
the center of the legal process, they are part of a “globalweb” which for some authors could 
imply the development of a genuine process of “Legal pluralism
91
”. Based on the new framing of 
the legal process, in our perception, it would be unwise to identify and compare the emergence of 
new legal orders (e.g. the Lex Sportiva, the Lex Mercatoria) on legal philosophical concepts 
which were developed under a complete outdated legal reality. The understanding of the legal 
process in our era shall be opened to new legal theories which could reflect and explain, from a 
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Having analyzed so far, essentially from a legal-philosophical point of view, the existence of 
commercial arbitration as part of a conceptual autonomous legal order, our intention is to 
demonstrate that, in practice, the development and establishment of this different understanding 
of the arbitral practice is a process which has already began. This process of transnationalisation 
of comercial arbitration can be identified through the ever growing scope of arbitration, under 
the concept of “Arbitrability”, the emergence of transnational principles of commercial 
arbitration and the harmonization of those transnational principles. Some authors went even 
further and identified in this process the genesis of a Transnational Law of Arbitration
93
. 
IV. The Transnationalization of Commercial Arbitration 
A. The Expanding Scope of Transnational Arbitration. 
 
A remarkable explanation for the emergence of the Lex Sportiva, as an autonomous legal order, 
lies in the relative low intervention of the State within the normative process. State courts have, 
historically, always been reluctant to intervene in sports disputes. The main reasons seem to be 
their lack of expertise, the fact that disputes regarding sports bodies’ decisions are often related 
to “field-of play-decisions”, and not rules of law, and also the genuine transnational nature of 
international sports law (based on contract).  
 
Obviously, in the commercial and financial sphere, the arguments for the autonomy above 
referred could not explain its transnational character. Nevertheless, a different phenomenon is 
taking place by which jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal is being expanded 
94
towards some 
“traditionally” national state courts domain, under the concept of “Arbitrability”.  
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- There is an explicit authorization of national courts as regards arbitral tribunals to exercise their 
jurisdiction in certain matters which previously where the exclusive competence of national 
courts, thereby a certain degree of confidence is being accorded to those tribunals; 
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 Objective Arbitrability 
 
General understanding is that arbitrability relates only to the subject matter arbitrability, the 
“objective arbitrability”. Consequently, the objective arbitrability is determined according to 
national laws, in particular by such laws that cannot be derogated by party autonomy, in other 
words the mandatory rules of law (to use the french expression “ Les Lois de Police”).  
If the question of arbitrability arises at the enforcement or recognition stage, national courts shall 
pronounce themselves on the issue. Accordingly, the New York Convention
95
 establishes that: 
 
iv) Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where 
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
 
v) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of that country. 
 
The same rationale can be found in the Model Law
96
 which provides that: 
 
Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was 
made, may be refused only: If the court finds that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the law of this State. 
 
The Model Law, as the New York Convention, both explicitly refer that the determination of the 
concept of Arbitrability depends only on national court’s interpretation. The arbitrability issue 
resolves the conflict between party autonomy and public order. As a result, the concept of 
arbitrability is a national one and relates to the question of which subject matter might be 
referred to arbitration by the parties (rights that are at the free disposition of the parties and 
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subject to the principle of party autonomy) and which cannot, and are therefore subject to the 
exclusive competence of national courts. “Modern arbitration laws contain substantive rules of 
private law that govern the subject matter arbitrability of claims that are in dispute in 
arbitrations which have their seat in that jurisdiction 
97
(e.g. Art.177 Swiss statute on Private 
International Law, Sect 1(1) Swedish Arbitration Act).  
 
The determination of objective arbitrability, due to its intrinsic connection with public order, 
arises mainly in disputes related with bribery and corruption, patents, trademarks and copyrights, 
insolvency, fraud, natural ressources, competition laws and antitrust. As regards the matters 
above, what is interesting to notice is the acknowledgement and, in some circumstances it 
wouldn’t be too farfetched to say, encouragement of national courts towards the arbitrability of 
disputes related to the subject matters so referred. The Mitsubishi
98
 case represents a perfect 
illustration of the trend towards the expansion of subject matter arbitrability, in the competition 
and antitrust field. 
 
In the case above referred, the Japanese automobile manufacturer (Mitsubishi) had granted to 
Soler the exclusive rights to distribute its vehicles in Puerto Rico, an Island under United States 
sovereignty. The parties’ agreement proscribed Soler from reselling outside Puerto Rico, 
particularly in the continental United States. Soler, finding himself unable to sell all the units for 
which it had contracted, wanted to circumvent this prohibition. Mitsubishi responded by seeking 
arbitration under the rules of the Japanese Arbitration association before three Japanese 
arbitrators sitting in Tokyo.Soler upheld that the clause forbidding resale outside Puerto rico 
violated the Sherman Act, and filed an action in US federal court requesting a ruling that the 
dispute was not arbitrable, and that the US federal courts alone were competent to decide 
disputes involving issues of anti-trust. The Us First Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding in this 
respect the US District court for the District of Puerto Rico, held that the arbitrators should not 
take place. In its view, arbitrators, who are usually recruited from the business community, 
should not be allowed to resolve disputes that may have an impact on the public interest, 
especially with respect to vital interests such as those embodied in the antitrust laws. 
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The Supreme Court reversed this decision by a five to three majority declaring first of all that it 
was convinced that the parties and the institution they had selected to organize the arbitration 
would choose competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators and second that due to the fact 
that the allegation of a violation of the Sherman Act would be raised before them, the arbitrators 
should rule on it. Even if they owe, as the Supreme Court noted, no prior allegiance to the legal 
norms of particular States, they at least have the duty to carry out the mission with which the 
parties have entrusted them. The dispute was thus referred to arbitration. This decision by the US 
Supreme Court represents a considerable turning point in what it relates to question of 
arbitrability. As stated by Berger
99
 “The significance of this problem is substantially reduced due 
to the worldwide trend in favor of arbitrability which has begun with the Mitsubishi decision of 
the US Supreme Court”. 
 
In Europe, the expansion of the objective arbitrability in favor of arbitral tribunals took place at 
the EU level, mainly through the influence of the European Court of Justice. In particular the 
decision Eco Swiss China Time Ltd vs. Benetton International NV
100
 where the ECJ ruled, in the 
context of a challenge to an award that gave effect to a license agreement that was alleged to 
violate Article 81 of the EU Treaty that: 
 
“A national court to which application is made for annulment of an arbitration award must 
grant that application if it considers that the award in question is in fact contrary to Article 81 
EC, where its domestic rules of procedure require it to grant an application for annulment 
founded on failure to observe national rules of public policy”. 
 
Another field that has assisted to the expansion of Arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction was in 
securities transactions, particularly in the United States. In 1953 the US Supreme Court decided 
that disputes under the securities act were not arbitrable
101
. Nevertheless, in 1974
102
 the court 
decided however, that those disputes were arbitrable in international commercial arbitration, by 
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affirming that “a parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international 
arbitration agreement would damage the fabric of international commerce and trade and imperil 
the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements” 
further decisions confirmed this position by the US court. 
 
The expanding scope of arbitrability might be understood as the expression of the autonomous 
character of arbitration towards domestic legal orders, even if, as we saw, in many cases this 
expansion is being assisted and conducted by national courts. Along with the expansion of the 
objective notion of arbitrability, its subjective understanding
103
 implied in international 
arbitration practice the emergence of a transnational general principle which, in our 
understanding, is another characteristic of the transnational nature of commercial arbitration. 
 
B. The Emergence of Transnational Principles of Commercial Arbitration. 
 Subjective Arbitrability 
 
 As opposed to the Objective Arbitrability, which is determined by national law or state courts, 
the Subjective Arbitrability is submitted to a different analysis in commercial arbitration. The 
justification of this different approach, lies in the fact that a party’s capacity to enter into a 
contract is generally determined according to the conflict of law rules that shall be applicable by 
a given jurisdiction. Therefore, different jurisdictions would provide different connecting factors 
to determine the party’s capacity to arbitrate. 
 
In International commercial arbitration differences between party's nationality, place of business, 
domicile or residence, or place of incorporation are rarely relevant
104
, “the general conflict rule 
for the determination of the law governing the substantive validity of the arbitration 
agreement
105
” shall not apply to the issue of whether a party was authorized to enter into an 
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” As Berger 
107
 referred, “Indeed, this approach reflects a general 
conflict rule which is accepted both in international commercial arbitration and in general 
conflicts doctrine”. 
 
The development of transnational principles of law, which are accepted as general principles of 
international arbitration practice, confirm this re-interpretation of the subjective arbitrability. 
Article 177(2) Swiss Private International Law Statute provides us a perfect illustration in 
determining that: “If a party to the arbitration agreement is a state or an enterprise or 
organization controlled by it, it cannot rely on its own law in order to contest its capacity to be a 
party to an arbitration or the arbitrability of a dispute covered by the arbitration agreement. It 
shall be noticed that as regards the application of the provision of law above stated, in what it 
relates to State Party’s capacity to enter into arbitration agreements article 177(2) Swiss Private 
International Law would supersede any general rule regarding parties’ capacity to enter into an 
arbitration agreement. This approach is not a particularity of the Swiss legislation. 
 
As above demonstrated, the transnational character of international arbitration can also be found 
in general principles which arise from arbitration practice and are presently recognized in main 
modern arbitration laws. This is the case of the principles of separability of the arbitration clause 
and Competence Competence. Due to their inherent function, which is to “(…) prevent 
premature judicial intervention from obstructing the arbitration process
108
” they contribute to 
insulate arbitral process from state intervention. 
 
 The Doctrine of Separability of the Arbitration Clause 
 
In international commercial arbitration, the arbitral clause is a separate contract from the main 
contract in which it is embodied. Therefore it survives nullity and termination of the main 
contract and still allows for the arbitral tribunal, to pronounce itself and to accomplish its 
mission. 
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 Accordingly, Model Law in its article 16 (1) stipulates that: 
 
For that purpose, an arbitration clause that forms part of a contract shall be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms within the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal 
that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. 
 
 The same rationale can be found in French Decree N.2011-48 portant réforme de l'arbitrage of 
13 January 2011
109
. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of separability of the arbitration clause in 
France has been admitted since 1963
110
. The English Arbitration Act of 1996 also recognizes this 
doctrine
111
.  Even though the terminology employed by the different legislations may differ, 
French Decree refers to an independence from any “ ineficacité” while Model Law stipulates that 
this independence covers cases where the main contract might be “null and void” and English 
Arbitration Act extends the scope of separability to main contracts that are invalid, have not 
come into existence or have become ineffective, having therefore a different scope as regards the 
separability doctrine, they all recognize this principle of international commercial arbitration. 
 
 Principle Of Competence Competence 
 
“Competence Competence is defined as the conferral of inherent power on the tribunal to 





Competence Competence is the corollary of the principle of separability of the arbitration clause 
from the main contract. Through the operation of these two principles arbitral tribunals 
determine their jurisdiction regarding a given subject matter before, except in certain given 
circumstances, any state court intervention. As with the doctrine of separability of the arbitration 
clause, modern arbitration laws contain provisions which allow arbitral tribunals to rule on their 
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own jurisdiction and therefore “rule that an arbitration agreement is invalid and to issue an 




French Decree N.2011-48 portant réforme de l'arbitrage of 13 January 2011(Art. 1448) contains 
such a provision. Also, Model Law Articles 8(1), 8(2), 16(1) and 16(3) in particular are relevant 
to competence-competence. Article 7(b) of Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law 
also deals with such a principle. 
 
Competence Competence in international arbitration is also relevant due to its “double effect”. 
The positive effect which is to allow arbitral tribunals to rule on their own jurisdiction but also a 
“negative effect” which determines the conditions that must be met for courts to rule on the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. Following the understanding above, article 7(b) of 
Switzerland’s Federal Statute on Private International Law provides that: 
 
“If the parties have concluded an arbitration agreement with respect to an arbitrable dispute, the 
Swiss court before which the action is brought shall decline its jurisdiction unless: 
 
b. The court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed”. 
 
In the French approach, Article 1458 NCPC provides that: If a dispute pending before an arbitral 
tribunal on the basis of an arbitration agreement is brought before a State court, it shall declare 
itself incompetent. If the dispute is not yet before an arbitral tribunal, the State court shall also 
declare itself incompetent, unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and void. In neither 
case may the State court declare itself incompetent at its own motion. 
 
It is not difficult to see a considerable difference in the provisions above considered, the French 
provision requiring for a much higher threshold for the courts to intervene. This is the 
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understanding of the French Cour de Cassation which stated 
114
 that the manifest nullity of the 
arbitration agreement could be ‘the only barrier to the principle that establishes priority of 
arbitral competence to rule on the existence, the validity and the scope of the arbitration 
agreement”. 
 
A quite different approach has been adopted by English 1996 Arbitration act
115
  which provides 
that: in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene except as provided by this 
Part’ and Section 9(4) provides that ‘On an application under this section the court shall grant a 
stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of 
being performed. 
 
The examples above demonstrate that modern arbitration laws reflect the principle of 
competence competence and it is only by variation of terminology that its effects may diverge. 
Competence Competence stands for another transnational principle of commercial arbitration. 
 
A reasonable deduction from the analysis herein contained, lead us to conclude that the 
transnational character of international arbitration derives also from general principles that are 
being developed and confer a wider autonomy to arbitral tribunals. Those principles relate not 
only to the arbitral process in itself, by “insulating” it from premature court intervention, but also 
from the development of more general rules of law which depart from traditional approaches (in 
particular traditional conflicts rules). 
 
The transnational character of commercial arbitration can also be found in the increased 
harmonization of domestic legislation. This process can be identified in the emergence of 
principles such as separability of the arbitration clause and competence competence, but also, 
which is quite remarkable, at the procedural level. 
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C. The Transnationalization of Commercial Arbitration at the Procedural Level 
 
In commercial arbitration, the determination of the relevant procedural law governing the 
arbitration can be ascertained through two distinct approaches. The first one would allow the 
procedural law to be determined according to the party’s intention. It would be justified by the 
strong autonomy, which is given to the parties as a characteristic of the arbitral process. The 
choice of law governing the arbitration would therefore encompass the applicable procedural law 
without regards to the place of arbitration (the subjective approach). 
 
A different alternative (the objective approach) would result from a more jurisdictional or 
territorial approach. In this case, the choice of the seat or place of arbitration, due to the 
territoriality principle, would determine the procedural law applicable to the arbitration. This is 
the approach adopted by the Model Law
116
 and some of the most influent arbitration laws
117
. 
Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act of 1987 applies “if the seat of the 





 for example. 
 
Even though it seems that the “objective” or territorial approach prevails, as regards 
determination of the procedural law, in reality modern arbitration laws essentially limit 
themselves to require that principles of “due process” are respected by parties and arbitral 
tribunals. As Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler points out “ The term “due process” refers to a 
number of notions with varying names under different national laws, including natural justice, 
procedural fairness, the right or opportunity to be heard, the so-called principe de la 
contradiction and equal treatment
120
. This attitude is followed by the French Decree N.2011-48 
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Remarkably, it is from the wide autonomy given to the parties and to the framing of the 
procedure applicable to the arbitration, which also derives from national arbitrations laws that the 
transnationalisation of the procedure in commercial arbitration arises. Fouchard
122
, already in 
1965 pointed out to the emergence and development of a Law of international commercial 
arbitration that was created by the international community. In the same perspective, Von 
Mehren
123
 refers to procedural “anational” rules and autonomous conflict rules. 
 
The transnationalisation of the procedural rules in commercial arbitration is essentially the 
consequence of two converging factors: the rules of private arbitral institutions and the 
harmonization of the lex arbitri. 
For Luis de Lima Pinheiro
124
, the rules developed by those private arbitral institutions, find their 
legal nature in the transnational sphere 
125
being therefore transnational in their essence. Which is 
more, they develop autonomously from any state intervention and are only limited due to the 
necessary interaction with domestic legal orders. Accordingly, some of the rules developed by 
such institutions have become standards of transnational arbitration so that arbitrators have a 
duty to comply with them. 
 
Also, the harmonization of domestic lex arbitri has a transnationalisation function. As above 
explained, modern lex arbitri essentially limit their intervention in the arbitral process, as regards 
procedural rules, by requiring that some, fundamental principles, are respected by any arbitral 
process. Through this operation, those fundamental principles “due process” are incorporated in 
the transnational arbitration since failing to comply with them, would offer the possibility to 
challenge such award. 
 




 1982:220 . 
124
 Arbitragem Transnacional, a determinação do estatuto da arbitragem, by Luis de Lima Pinheiro page 
445. 
125
 One of the arguments of authors who defend the Lex Mercatoria as an autonomous legal order or 
identify an arbitral legal order is based on the existence of a transnational sphere which would transcend 
domestic legal orders. This transnational sphere results from the transnational activity of commercial 
operators and domestic legal orders attitude towards such activity, in particular its non intervention. 
Commercial operators would therefore be given wide autonomy to regulate their activities in this 
transnational sphere. 
54 
D. In Summary 
 
Arbitration is undoubtedly “the principal method of resolving disputes between States, 
individuals, and corporations in almost every aspect of international trade, commerce and 
investment”
126
. This fact justifies that presently, the scope of arbitrable matters is being 
expanded towards some more traditionally reserved State court’s Jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
the development of Arbitration implies two separate but intrinsically connected phenomenon’s:  
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Transnational arbitration is just not only the best way forward, in commercial arbitration, but it is 
the only way forward. This idea encompasses different perspectives. As regards its legal sources, 
arbitration is genuinely transnational. Nevertheless, the “transnationalisation” of commercial 
arbitration reflects two distinct realities which represent current trends and the evolution of 
commercial arbitration. The first one being, the development of transnational principles and rules 
(e.g. principle of competence competence but also procedural rules that have been developed by 
Arbitral Institutions) and the second one, the convergence of modern arbitration laws ( this is 
particularly the case regarding procedural rules, as above demonstrated) .  
 
The concept of transnational arbitration also leads us to question the role of the “Pierre 
angulaire” of arbitration, the New York Convention, and particularly the fact that such 
instrument, might be outdated nowadays since it was drafted in a state centered social, legal and 
economic environment. In our opinion, the revision of such a document, in a transnational 
perspective might reveal itself as being appropriate. 
 
A particular attention shall be given to the discussion of the existence of an arbitral legal order. 
To the extent that such a legal order might exist, and in our understanding this legal order would 
exist under the concept of the New Lex Mercatoria, it shall not be assumed that this legal order 
would be autonomous as regards domestic legal orders. Domestic legal orders, in commercial 
arbitration, still have an important role to play even if such a role shall be more of a supportive 
nature than an interventionist nature. An interesting example of such a perspective has been 
given by French Institutions attitude and their supporting position in the recognition of 
transnational arbitration. 
 
Finally, it is also our opinion that the “creation” of a “supreme court” for arbitral disputes, as it 
exists in Sports Legal System, could represent an interesting approach in arbitration. As we saw, 
such an instrument could bring coherence and structure to the body of rules and norms which are 
56 
being developed in the commercial sphere and therefore its role in the development of the New 
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